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Abstract 
Innovation theory has pointed to the complex, non-linear character of 
innovation processes. Heterogeneous networks of actors that include 
a mixed spectrum of academic, economic, and governmental actors 
and agencies combine to achieve innovations. Is there any role for 
innovation policy beyond influencing framework conditions in such a 
situation? The article analyses the case of a successful innovation in 
the energy sector: Photovoltaics. It argues that - given the special 
characteristics of the energy sector – successful innovation depended 
on strong political support and an advocacy coalition which achieved 
institutional backing. The method chosen to realize the innovation 
was the creation of a niche market with the help of regulatory in-
struments. 
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1 Introduction 
The energy provision system in industrialized nations is changing in 
what is conceived as an example of a technological and institutional 
regime change. Victor (2002) sees the sector in its third structural 
transformation. The exact outcome of this regime change is uncertain 
as of yet, but one element of a future governance structure will be the 
increased importance of decentralized forms of electric power gen-
eration, a shift towards more environmentally sustainable technolo-
gies, e.g. renewable energy technologies, which in the past were 
pushed forward by a diverse coalition of actors. This article will focus 
on one of the most innovative developments in the area of renewable 
energy technologies: photovoltaics (PV).  
We will use a broad lens in order to examine the growth of 
PV both as a source of electric power generation and as a business 
sector in Germany. PV can be considered an unusual success story in 
which political actors’ ability to make a significant impact on renew-
able energy production and the associated economic activity looms 
large. 
It will be argued that the growth of renewable energy takes 
place within networks of governance comprising formal regimes at 
multiple levels, informal norms and practices as well as market struc-
tures and processes. Actors within these networks include national 
and sub-national authorities, multilateral institutions, firms and 
NGOs. Technological development and market growth of PV are thus 
viewed as embedded in a broad social, economic, and political sys-
tem of governance. Corporate strategies, social movements and pub-
lic policy interact within, as well as constitute, the essential elements 
of governance in this sector. We will further argue that policy on PV 
in Germany is characterized by a specific mission orientation, the 
concertation of main actors, a long term orientation and substantive 
subsidies. Insofar PV can be seen as a successful as well as a 
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“planned” innovation, something quite uncommon in the literature 
on innovation. Caniels/Romijn (2008: 246) have argued that within 
the literature on strategic niche management there is a shortage of 
analysis focussing on success stories, i.e. a lack of understanding 
about the processes by which (policy and technological) experiments 
can culminate in viable market niches that ultimately will contribute 
to a regime change in a specific sector. This article attempts to fill that 
gap. 
What will we be doing in the article step by step? To start 
with, we will clarify our concept of innovation and describe the ele-
ments of the technological system PV. Based on this we will discuss 
the factors responsible for its success. At the moment it would be 
foolish to claim that PV will remain a success story in the future and 
that PV will eventually play a dominant role in the development of a 
new energy regime. PV is growing but it is still not in a settled and 
stable state – albeit already bigger than many “established” sectors. 
Only few publications have focused on the particular technological 
and institutional prerequisites, which enabled photovoltaics to be-
come such a success story, and beating – from an innovation perspec-
tive – other energy technologies, such as fuel cell technologies. Since 
the success of specific technologies in a system as complex as the 
energy supply system at least partly depends on the interaction with 
and the development path of competing systems, we will shortly 
review some of the other renewables at the end of the article, just to 
get some ideas on what might have been the particular comparative 
advantages of photovoltaics. 
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2 Innovation and Sectoral Systems 
of Innovation 
Before discussing German innovation policy focussing on the devel-
opment and market expansion of photovoltaics, we have to lay down 
the conceptual framework of our analysis. We start with some gen-
eral reflections on innovation and innovation policy, drawing on the 
literature on systems of innovation and strategic niche management 
on the one hand and the advocacy coalition approach on the other. 
2.1 Innovation Policy 
Since the 1990s a global shift in policies towards research and tech-
nology can be observed: the promotion of innovation has become the 
centre piece of official national as well as of supra- and sub-national 
policies. This shift in emphasis reflects discussions on the role of the 
state in promoting technology as well as new ideas about how new 
technologies become successful on the markets.  
The traditional model in research and technology policies ei-
ther centred on the support of basic research which eventually should 
bring about new technologies ripe for the markets (technology push) 
or opted for a mission oriented approach deciding to support a spe-
cific technology and financing its development through specific com-
panies or research laboratories. (cp. Hiskes/Hiskes 1986)  Innovation 
research, however, has shown that there is no linear development of 
technological innovations towards success (on the market). Support 
of basic research does not guarantee the eventual development of 
products that become widely accepted and thus achieve commercial 
success. But specifically “market success” appears to have become the 
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top priority in times of increasing worldwide competition on 
crowded markets. The introduction of new, innovative products is 
considered to be a precondition for maintaining a competitive edge. 
In order to be commercially successful, it is of vital importance to 
reach a critical mass of usage within a comparably short time frame 
(cf. Rogers 1995: 313ff.).  
In parallel discussions on the state’s influence on technologi-
cal innovation processes a dire picture was painted, accentuating the 
conviction that the state is unable to chose technologies which will 
later be a success on the market. Along with an increasingly prevalent 
attitude that markets are the best innovators and should be left alone, 
policy instruments worldwide seemed to converge (cf. 
Holzinger/Jörgens/Knill 2007). This neoliberal understanding, the 
support of market dominance and “the retreat of the state” (Strange 
1996) emerged in the 1990s and was accompanied by new types of 
policies and policy instruments which also affected the design of 
technology policy. Research and technology policy now became 
transformed into innovation policy and mainly focused on funding 
basic research and network activities as well as joint projects between 
firms and research institutes in order to stimulate knowledge flows 
and to ensure that the results of scientific research can be used and 
adopted commercially (cf. Nooteboom 1999, Edquist 2001:18). Public 
actors – however, were not supposed to select a certain technology in 
advance and would rather abstain from market stimulation pro-
grammes. Networks instead were looked upon as potentially facilitat-
ing producer-customer relationships or creating advocacy coalitions 
for new technological applications. Advocacy coalitions are consid-
ered by most experts to be an important pre-condition for successful 
radical innovations (cf. Weimer-Jehle/Fuchs 2007).  
Although the market discourse had achieved nearly universal 
legitimacy, counter tendencies have always been visible as well. 
Complexity theory and the literature on governance aimed at a new 
understanding of the role of politics (cf. Kappelhoff 2000; 
Werle/Schimank 2000): On the one hand social developments are 
unpredictable and evolutionary, but on the other hand these evolu-
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tionary dynamics have always been accompanied by conscious plan-
ning and shaping (cf. Czada/Schimank 2000). Thus political actors are 
interpreted as actors interacting in governance networks, together 
with other actors who also try to influence social developments. One 
of the policy measures relying more on the activities of public actors 
is the politically supported creation of niche markets. This new form of 
innovation policy selects a certain technology (or its pre-stage) in 
advance and tries to speed up its development, and even might help 
to shape the mode of its application. Such politically created niche 
markets work through market stimulation programmes, such as sub-
sidies or the provision of soft loans for prospective customers, as well 
as through modes of legitimising the developing technology in order 
to raise its public acceptance (cf. Edler 2007). Especially in the area of 
environmental technologies, strategic niche management has increas-
ingly become accepted as an instrument of innovation policy (cf. 
Kemp et al 1998; Kemp 2002; Coenen 2002) in the hopes that even the 
transformation of entire technological regime is a viable option (cf. 
Berkhout et al 2003: 4; Caniels/Romijn 2008). 
The actual design of national policies has to consider existing 
institutional frameworks and socio-cultural conditions. Work in the 
tradition of the Varieties of Capitalism approach claims, that if na-
tional innovation policy stresses and uses national comparative insti-
tutional advantages, it can be more successful. In other words a sys-
tem dominated by non-market coordination will have difficulties 
pushing new technologies dependent on a flexible and quick func-
tioning of market mechanisms. While on the other hand the support 
of technologies which require the non-market coordination of various 
actors will be difficult to put into effect in liberal market economies. 
Based on this highly stylised interpretation we argue that the creation 
of (sheltered) niche markets can be a successful policy instrument 
especially in coordinated market economies (hypothesis 1).  
Considering the fact, that photovoltaics can be seen as a tech-
nological innovation that is supported in order to transform the en-
ergy sector, the existence of political and social forces strongly oppos-
ing photovoltaics for ideological as well as economic (rent seeking) 
8 G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?  
 
 
reasons can be assumed. As Jänicke has shown, changes in actor con-
stellations have resulted in improved conditions for innovation in 
environmentally friendly products (cf. 1997: 7). With regard to actor 
constellations and situational factors enhancing policy change, the 
policy analysis literature refers to the role of advocacy coalitions that 
are crucially important in order to spur institutional or cultural 
changes (cf. Litfin 2000). We will argue that the success of innovation 
policy depends on its ability to create and mobilise an advocacy coali-
tion supporting the technology in question, especially if strong in-
cumbent actors (such as the established energy provision system) 
exist (hypothesis 2). 
2.2 Innovation 
Changes in innovation policy are linked to a better understanding of 
processes of innovation. Innovation can be defined as artefacts, proc-
esses, ideas, strategies, which successfully change routines and are 
embedded in specific contexts of development and usage. Innovation 
as such is not just a new idea or technical system, but one which is 
being successfully implemented. Including the processes of imple-
mentation, however, it becomes difficult to disentangle e.g. the tech-
nical artefact from the way it is being developed and used.  
Innovation in this sense is not a linear process but occurs by 
interactive relationships and feedback mechanisms between institu-
tional and organisational elements of science, technology, learning, 
production, policy, firms and potential or actual market demand. 
Some technologies may only become innovations due to interactions 
between producers and users or the specific way, customers use and 
apply new technical artefacts (cf. Malerba 2004: 24). The acceptance 
and the use of a new technology at any rate play a crucial role in the 
innovation process. Thus new – better – technologies in our context 
are only referred to as innovations, if their development is embedded 
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and accompanied by the establishment of a successful industry and if 
they find their way to the market. 
2.3 Innovation and Uncertainty 
It is generally acknowledged that every (economic) activity has to 
face the problem of uncertainty (Beckert 1996). This is even more so 
the case for innovations, particularly if potential new products would 
have to cope with incumbent products and existing infrastructures 
and routines supporting them. Proven ways to cope with uncertainty 
are the development and reliance on routines, customs, regulations, 
established institutions etc.  
Innovating firms may not know which application or design 
a new technology should be given in order for it to be successful on 
the market. This can lead firms to become hesitant when implement-
ing significant changes, even as they face a volatile environment that 
increases pressures to introduce new products, seek new markets and 
introduce new technologies, practices and organisational methods 
into their production processes. Uncertainty can also make it more 
difficult for firms to obtain external funding for their innovation pro-
jects. Customers may not trust a new and unproven technology. This 
leads to another blocking mechanism for the diffusion of a new tech-
nology, which is lack of legitimacy.  
Here we are confronted with the paradox that innovation as a 
routine changing mechanism, nevertheless also depends on routines, 
albeit newly developing ones.  Innovation policy can attempt to re-
duce uncertainty by establishing a mix of policy instruments along 
with a viable support coalition. Whenever, e.g. innovation policy can 
provide technological developments with legitimacy, the financial 
system will become more willing to invest in innovative firms and 
potential customers may feel securer and be more inclined to pur-
chase new technologies (cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson 1997: 285). 
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The role of uncertainty can be seen very clearly when looking 
at the developments in the 1990s. At one point the German PV-
industry was close to extinction and production facilities were 
moved, since producers had no certainty as to whether the institu-
tional framework in Germany would provide favourable conditions 
for the further development of the PV industry. 
As Edquist suggests, a systemic view on innovation policy 
should not only analyze the role of the state but also include feedback 
mechanisms on how the rest of the system, social structures, routines 
or even discrete occurrences influence innovation policies (cf. 2001: 
17). As German governance has always been characterized by close 
linkages and the reliance on common interests between the govern-
ments, industry, business associations and unions (cf. Hall/Soskice 
2001; Harding 2000), this established form of governance has also 
shaped German innovation policies and most probably will also do 
so in the case of PV.  
2.4 Electric Power Generation as an In-
dustrial Sector 
Photovoltaics are treated as an innovation within and for the indus-
trial sector of electric power generation. As already briefly mentioned 
this sector is undergoing severe changes in nearly all industrialized 
nations. The dynamics leading to these changes are also important in 
order to understand the case of PV, because they opened a window of 
opportunity which helped to push forward the new option PV. 
The traditional electric power system can be looked upon as a 
large technical system (cf. Mayntz/Hughes 1988), tightly coupled and 
run by a few, powerful incumbent actors. Energy generation is highly 
centralized in big power stations, open markets hardly exist. Price 
regulation and fixation is common and huge subsidies for the devel-
opment of old and new technologies (e.g. coal, nuclear energy) make 
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it difficult to determine “real” prices. There are suggestions that the 
costs of producing electricity, gained out of coal or oil would double, 
if hidden external costs were taken into account (cf. Milborrow 2002: 
32). Incumbent energy technologies have received direct and indirect 
subsidies for decades (cf. Jacobsson/Bergek 2004: 210). R&D expendi-
tures in these closed markets are nevertheless low and innovation is 
slow-moving and incremental. R&D expenditures depend to a very 
large degree on the interpretation of political signals regarding the 
regulation of technology. 
Two trends are now changing the traditional ways: the liber-
alisation of infrastructures and environmental issues, namely “global 
warming”. Hopes for an effective regime to address climate change 
have shifted from the emphasis on a mandatory multilateral agree-
ment, the Kyoto protocol, towards a plethora of regional, national, 
and sub-national programs and initiatives. Policy responses include 
carbon emission limits and trading systems, direct subsidies for re-
newable and Renewable Portfolio Standards that mandate the use of 
specific volumes of renewable energy in electricity generation. Such 
policy responses are required because the market will not, by itself, 
respond adequately to the environmental challenge. Given the rapid 
growth expected in global markets for low-emission technologies, the 
policy agenda is also driven by economic development goals, as 
countries vie for competitiveness and market share in these emerging 
fields. Liberalisation can have differing effects for renewable ener-
gies. If energy prices fall as a result of liberalisation and increased 
market competition (as economic theory would make us believe) the 
price targets that renewables must meet become more challenging 
and liberalisation might prove to be an impediment for their further 
spread. On the other hand, policies and systems such as quotas and 
renewable energy certificates can be compatible with more competi-
tive market structures as the experiences of the last years has shown – 
supported e.g. by a general increase in energy prices. In fact, many of 
the policies which have been implemented for the support of renew-
ables operate within the framework of a transition to market liberali-
sation (Cf. OECD 2008). 
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Finally, beyond the problems of lacking transparency and the 
prevalence of risk-averse actors, there is the constraining factor of 
centralised energy infrastructures, as they have developed and have 
become established over decades. National grids are mainly tailored 
to the operation of centralised power plants and thus support their 
existence. Alternative technologies like photovoltaics follow an oppo-
site decentralised logic that does not easily fit the established techno-
logical concepts and thus faces difficulties competing with incumbent 
technologies (cf. Stern 2006: 355). 
In sum this has led to the widely accepted conviction that 
policy instruments which aim to create niche markets for renewable 
energies were needed. Even the European Commission, which tradi-
tionally favours market instruments and is rather critical towards 
demand side policy actions, has opted for market stimulation pro-
grammes for renewable energy technologies (cf. European Commis-
sion 2005; Directive 2001/77/EC). This is true in spite of the fact that 
until recently the European Commission and the OECD both disap-
proved the German model of market stimulation and instead had 
favoured quota models which use market signals in order to increase 
the supply of renewable energy (cf. Busch 2005: 235). 
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3 Photovoltaics: Technology Charac-
teristics 
3.1 Technologies 
Before analyzing photovoltaics as a successful case of innovation, we 
need to provide a short introduction to the technologies and applica-
tions we are talking about. Photovoltaics use solar cells to produce 
electric power1
                                                          
1 Photovoltaics should not to be mixed up with solar-thermy, which 
uses solar radiation to produce heat. 
. The most common type of solar cell consists of either 
mono-crystalline or poly-crystalline silicon, which is conventionally 
produced and used in the electronics (semiconductor) industry. Crys-
talline silicon technologies represent 93 % of the photovoltaics world 
market (cf. Solarbuzz 2007). Mono-crystalline silicon cells are charac-
terised by their ability to convert a relatively large section of the light 
spectrum into electricity with an efficiency of up to 24,7 % under 
ideal laboratory conditions (cf. Solarserver 2007). Poly-crystalline 
silicon cells do not achieve such high efficiency rates, but they com-
pensate by being less costly. The same holds for amorphous and 
other ‘thin film’ technologies that consist of cadmium telluride 
(CdTe) or copper indium dieseline (CIS). Due to silicon shortages 
since the turn of the century, research and development on non-
silicon thin film technologies has become increasingly popular and 
remarkable reductions in production costs have been achieved.  
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3.2 Applications 
The photovoltaic effect was first discovered by the French physicist 
Alexandre Becquerel in 1839. Albert Einstein’s theoretical work on 
the photovoltaic effect won the Nobel Prize in 1921. Thus basic re-
search on photovoltaics has been conducted for quite some time. Yet 
the first applications did not appear before the 1950s, when Bell 
Laboratories invented the first solar cell and the US government 
started to use solar cells on satellites.“The satellite market became the 
first significant commercial market and annual production rose to 
about 0, 1 MWp per year in the late 1960s” (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 
10). It is striking that the first satellite project using solar power, was 
under US Navy management and monitored by the Department of 
Defense. Some authors therefore pointed out that the case of photo-
voltaics was one of many technological developments in which the 
military played a crucial role (cf. Clark/Juma 1987: 142, Jacobsson et al 
2002: 10). Due to US export restrictions the European Space Agency 
had to rely on German companies such as Siemens and Telefunken to 
get involved in photovoltaics research and production for space pro-
grams in the 1960s (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 16). Since the 1970s and 
largely due to the oil crises, interest in the development of various 
terrestrial applications grew and led to further R&D activities, mainly 
in the USA and Japan. A range of off-grid applications emerged, that 
were mainly used for consumer electronics like calculators and 
watches or as stand-alone ‘power stations’ for SOS telephones and for 
remote places like buoys, yachts, alpine huts and camping. Further-
more the idea of solar home systems to be employed in developing 
countries came up. Rather distinct from these off-grid photovoltaics 
are newer forms of applications which supply electricity to the grid 
just as conventional power technologies. Grid-connected applications 
can be found as roof-top systems, ground-mounted systems or as 
systems integrated into house façades. However, demonstration 
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projects which employed photovoltaics in order to supply electricity 
to the grid were not implemented before the 1990s. Thus grid-
connected photovoltaics are a rather new development. It is therefore 
striking that since 1999 grid-connected photovoltaics have rapidly 
outpaced other forms of application in IEA (International Energy 
Agency) reporting countries (cf. IEA 2005).  
 
The degree of efficiency of the modules depends on the spe-
cific technology used. For all technologies it can be stated that huge 
differences exist between laboratory values and values that are 
achieved using products for the market: 
 
Table 1: Degree of efficiency of various technologies. 
 mono-Si 
(Silicium 
technology) 
poly-Si 
(Silicium 
technology) 
CulnSe2 
(CIS techno-
logy) 
CulnS2 (CIS 
technology 
Lab cells      
small area,    1 
cm2 
24,7% 20,3% 19,3% 13% 
large area, 150 
cm2 
21,5% 17,6% - - 
Current module 
production  
    
Optimum value 17% 14,5% 12% - 
Typical 13,5% 13% 11% 8,5% (pro-
jected) 
Future module 
production 
    
In 10 years 20% 18% 15% 15% 
In 30-40 years 22% 22% 20% - 
Source: Krewitt et al 2005: 25 
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Fig. 1: PV - Degree of efficiency (classical silicon technology). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Surek (2003) and Nemet 
(2005) 
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4 Promoting Photovoltaics 
In the following we will analyse the development of Photovoltaics 
based on the hypothesis that an advocacy coalition is a crucial me-
chanism behind the formulation and implementation of innovation 
policies. “Private firms, state agencies and other organisations often 
act with the objective to influence innovation policies in order to get 
them designed and implemented in their own interest” (cf. Edquist 
2001: 20). So called advocacy coalitions supporting environmental 
policies consist of administrative and academic environmentalists as 
well as members of environmental social movements who cooperate 
with industrial actors, such as manufacturers of renewable energy 
technologies (cf. Jänicke 2007: 140). But since lobbyism is often a con-
servative mechanism, as it requires that the lobbyists be in a position 
of economic power, one would not assume that environmentalists 
were able to form an effective advocacy coalition, since interest 
groups that support emerging technologies normally are not well 
positioned financially, neither do they have the ability to influence 
powerful political actors.  
Although the photovoltaics advocacy coalition was not 
formed by very powerful actors and groups, it intelligently managed 
to use external events to gain strong social backing for its ideas, 
which was needed, as it faced powerful opponents in form of incum-
bent energy provision systems. “Substituting established technolo-
gies implies, (…), that new interest groups will challenge existing 
ones, and a realignment of the institutional framework, and a trans-
formation of the energy provision system cannot be expected to be 
achieved without overcoming considerable opposition from vested 
interests involved with the incumbent technologies.” (Jacobsson et al 
2002: 3) 
We will show how in the formative stage, the PV advocacy 
coalition aimed to support the diffusion of the technology in order to 
reach a critical mass, which was needed for a substantial change in 
the energy sector. Once this critical mass had been reached, self-
stabilizing effects occurred. As a consequence, the critical mass itself 
18 G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?  
 
 
accounted for a further consolidation of the advocacy coalition and 
contributed to its success.  
4.1 The Formative Stage 
The story of PV began like many other cases of German research pol-
icy. From the early eighties on, common instruments of public re-
search and development funding such as financing research depart-
ments conducting basic research on PV were employed. The external 
trigger for early research had been the oil crisis in the 1970s. At that 
time the ministry of research and technology (BMFT) was in charge of 
photovoltaics policy programmes. Initially the support for new tech-
nology had been integrated into the unit for non-nuclear energy 
technologies. In 1976 a unit of its own was created (cf. Ristau 1998: 
40). Interestingly, many of the programmes financing photovoltaics 
projects were carried out by the ministry of economic cooperation 
and development, since during the 1970s the future of photovoltaics 
applications was seen in solar home systems for developing coun-
tries, i.e. the focus was on off-grid applications.  
When oil prices had settled down again and as the conserva-
tive-liberal coalition under Chancellor Kohl came into power, policy 
actions promoting photovoltaics declined severely. In 1985 public 
funding of photovoltaics related research and development projects 
accounted to less than 53 Mio DM. Albeit institutional actors in-
volved in research on photovoltaics had been established. When ex-
ternal events such as the Chernobyl accident and the discussions on 
environmental problems and climate change emerged, these actors 
together with environmentalist groups, managed to set the agenda 
for photovoltaics. When political actors gave environmental problems 
a higher priority, the Green party on the one hand and highly moti-
vated researchers on the other hand acted as transmission belts be-
tween external events and political and social discourses.  
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In the 1980s specialized photovoltaics departments and re-
search institutes had been created, such as  the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Solar Energy Systems ISE in Freiburg (in 1982), the Centre for 
Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-Württemberg in Stutt-
gart/Ulm (in 1988) or specialised physics departments, for example at 
the Carl von Ossietzky University in Oldenburg. The latter can be 
seen as a typical example of how the formation of the photovoltaics 
advocacy coalition depended on highly committed individual actors. 
They were influenced by the experiences made by early anti-nuclear 
power activists, who were criticised for their lack of reasonable alter-
natives for energy provision (cf. Gabler 2007). The formation of re-
search groups and departments dedicated to the development of 
alternatives to nuclear power became the first strategic step towards 
the formation of an advocacy coalition supporting photovoltaics. 
Furthermore, the creation of specialised departments and institutes 
attracted environmentally committed scientists. On this foundation 
local networks consisting of environmentalists and researchers 
emerged. This was especially the case in Freiburg, where the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE had been created and 
merged with a vivid environmental scene, that positively influenced 
network activities and enabled local strategies of niche management 
(cf. Niewienda 2006).  
Federal innovation policy at that time became mainly direct 
project funding. The main recipients were the Fraunhofer Institute for 
Solar Energy Systems, the Hahn-Meitner-Institute, the Institute for 
Solar Energy Supply Techniques and two industrial actors, AEG-
Telefunken and Siemens Solar. The early photovoltaics programmes 
“…provided opportunities for universities, institutes and firms to 
search in many directions, which was sensible given the underlying 
uncertainties with respect to technologies and markets” (cf. 
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 262). Research funding was not only given to 
one technology, but competing technologies, such as crystalline sili-
con and thin-film technologies. Additionally, research and develop-
ment of inverters (to make grid-connected applications work) had 
begun. 
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Interestingly, these research projects on the one hand, and the 
absence of market stimulation programmes on the other hand, led to 
the odd situation, that the big two German companies engaged in 
photovoltaics production were able to develop internationally com-
petitive products, and German research on photovoltaics achieved a 
leading position in the world, but the technologies developed could 
not be sold at home due to a lack of domestic demand (cf. Ristau 
1998: 45). Actually, photovoltaic technologies developed in Germany 
were ready for testing. However, owing to the characteristics of the 
energy sector, coupled with the difficulties of creating private de-
mand and the absence of political interest and financial support, at 
that time it looked very unlikely that photovoltaics could succeed on 
the German market. The supporting advocacy coalition was in its 
infancy, consisting only of highly committed scientists, environ-
mental groups (cf Gabler 2007) and the newly founded German asso-
ciation for Solar Energy. In these early days the advocacy coalition 
was too weak, particularly as it had not yet incorporated more pow-
erful industrial lobbies. On the other hand, very influential lobby 
groups supporting fossil fuels and nuclear power worked hard to 
prevent competition from renewable energies. They joined forces 
with the ministry of economics (cf. Ristau 1998: 46), and heavily re-
lied on old research and development contacts and networks within 
the ministry of research (cf. Ristau 1998: 44). 
But eventually external events, such as the nuclear accident in 
Chernobyl in 1986 changed public opinion and the attitudes towards 
nuclear power substantially and opened up a window of opportunity 
for a general discussion on a transformation of the energy sector. 
Within two years opposition against nuclear energy increased from 
50% to over 70% (cf. Jahn 1992). Whereas before only the Green party 
had argued against nuclear power, this position was now also 
adopted by the Social Democrats, who opted for phasing out nuclear 
power plants. In addition to the national antipathy towards nuclear 
energy the influence of a growing Green party as well as powerful 
environmental movements were important factors. Considering all 
these ‘external events’, the German government – compared to other 
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European governments – at a relatively early stage felt compelled to 
support research, development as well as diffusion of renewable en-
ergy technologies, such as photovoltaics.  
Market stimulation programmes are traditionally policy in-
struments of the ministry of economics and were not used before 
1991. As we have mentioned before, the ministry of economics delib-
erately refused to support the photovoltaics research and develop-
ment projects of the ministry of research. And since the new technol-
ogy was definitely not economically competitive in Germany, it either 
had to fail, find its markets abroad (in Southern regions, as off grid 
applications in the developing world) or supported domestically via 
an artificial niche market. Finally in 1991, the situation changed when 
the first feed-in-law was developed and passed. The law had been 
initiated by Green Party and CDU/CSU parliamentarians and it could 
finally pass due to cross-factional support (cf. Ohlhorst et al. 2008: 
16). In the run-up to the adoption, lobbying activities of a range of 
different associations had been of vital importance. Besides the newly 
founded renewable energy associations, the incumbent association of 
hydropower plants was active, so that especially Bavarian parliamen-
tarians supported the law. In retrospect, analysts assumed that at the 
time the future impact of the law had been underestimated, which is 
why it was passed without much difficulty (cf. Ohlhorst et al. 2008: 
17). The law described a mechanism which required utilities to re-
munerate energy of renewable sources fed into the grid. Producers of 
renewable electric power received 90% of the average revenue per 
kilowatt hour from the utilities. Even though the first feed-in-law was 
sort of a market stimulation programme, it contained a market 
mechanism, which at the beginning was not seen as critical, but with 
energy prices declining throughout the 1990s (mainly due to Euro-
pean deregulation policies), this policy instrument ended up being 
too weak to trigger market expansion for photovoltaics.  
This first feed-in-law was accompanied by the 1000-roofs-
programme in the early 1990s, which enabled first experiences with 
grid-connected photovoltaics applications and thus can be inter-
preted as a typical instrument of strategic niche management. The 
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1000 roof programme that started in 1991 and ended in 1995 was a 
mixture of a demonstration and market stimulation programme. It 
offered soft loans for private households who were interested in par-
ticipating in the grid-connected photovoltaics test stage. The pro-
gramme was not only accompanied by electro-technical and physical 
tests on inverters, cell duration etc (cf. Grochowski et al 1997), but 
also by social research which studied customers’ motives and social 
affiliations (cf. Gennenig/Hoffmann 1996). This first niche pro-
gramme became crucial for institutional capacity building and sym-
bolized an initial step towards a transformation of the energy sector. 
Routines and motives of first movers could be revealed, and thus 
enabled the advocacy coalition to improve its diffusion strategy, for 
example by better taking into account special needs of potential us-
ers. The accompanying social research revealed that ¾ of the partici-
pants were academics, and 22% were teachers. The majority declared 
environmental reasons as the main motive to participate in the pro-
gram. Interestingly, only 15% of the participants could be characte-
rized as real energy savers; instead the majority did not intend to 
abstain from comfort, for example by changing routines. On the other 
hand, 38% of them were extremely interested in technical aspects of 
their PV application and carried through technical implementations 
on their own. 15% of the participants admitted status reasons as their 
main motive when purchasing their PV application. For them it was 
extremely important that the technology was widely visible (cf. Ge-
nennig/Hoffmann 1996: 111ff.). Additionally, the programme enabled 
photovoltaics to gain more public awareness. Backed by the feed-in-
law, which obliged utilities to remunerate energy of renewable 
sources fed into the grid, the improvement of inverters laid down the 
grounds for structural changes within the energy sector, abandoning 
traditional centralised grid systems, giving way for decentralised, 
environmental friendly systems, such as grid connected photovoltaics 
applications.  
When the 1000 roofs programme ended and the German gov-
ernment did not immediately develop follow-up programmes, 
“…one could observe a shift in the investment activities of the big 
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European PV-companies from Europe towards the US” (Jäger-
Waldau 2002: 40). The ministry of economics started a market launch 
programme for renewable energy technologies in 1995. But since it 
only provided 4, 5 Mio. DM for photovoltaics, it did not meet the 
expectations of the photovoltaics industry (cf. Ristau 1998). So this is 
a striking example for the relationship between uncertainty and in-
novation, since throughout the 1990s the German policy did not sys-
tematically aim to reduce uncertainty, as the programmes were in-
adequately financed and were not based on long-term considerations. 
The result was that the development of technical innovations and 
marketable products came to a halt. This only changed, when the 
Green party together with the Social Democrats came into power on 
the federal level in 1998.  
Despite its shortcomings, it still has to be acknowledged that 
the 1990s can be characterised by early (successful) investments. Pub-
licly funded R&D, as well as the first market stimulation programmes 
and the first feed-in law did not only lead to the establishment of an 
initial knowledge base, it also led to the creation of an embryonic 
advocacy coalition consisting of scientists, an infant industry and its 
interest groups, as well as highly committed environmentalists. Some 
of them appeared as first movers on the market, which means they 
were the first costumers, taking part in the 1000-roof programme. 
Even though the programme offered soft loans, and the power pro-
duced was remunerated, these first users did not benefit in a mone-
tary sense, which means they did not really get anything out of their 
investment, neither did they earn money. Instead they appeared as 
‘the hard core’ of the advocacy coalition, mainly acting out of ideo-
logical or reputational reasons. But there was positive feed-back from 
those early investments, which for example resulted in the ability of 
the coalition to shape further institutional change and to initiate sec-
toral transformation. Taken together these first political programmes 
had significant effects. For one thing public awareness of the new 
technology rose and photovoltaics received legitimacy. Thus public 
and social acceptance of the technology as well as political support, 
i.e. subsidising it, found broad approval in public opinion. Further-
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more, a number of new, often small firms entered the market, 
“….among these, we find both module manufacturers and integrators 
of solar cells into facades and roofs, the latter moving the market for 
solar cells into new applications” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 266). Be-
fore this, the market had been dominated by the two big players, 
Siemens and AEG Telefunken. The following figures provide an indi-
cation of the their market dominance. In 1991, when the 1000-roofs-
programme was initiated, 99,5 % of market demand was satisfied by 
these two companies. And even in 1993 once the programme was 
opened for European competitors like BP-Solar and the Italian firm 
Helios, Siemens and ASE still held a market share of 70% (cf. Ristau 
1998: 48).  
Throughout the 1990s, industrial (solar) associations were 
gradually established that aimed to improve and enhance political 
support of the infant technology and its commercialisation. Addi-
tionally, (local) groups and societies, like the Solar Group Aachen e. 
V. , Eurosolar (European Association for Renewable Energies) and 
the German Association for the Promotion of Solar Power were 
founded and discussed the suitability of political instruments, were 
developing blue prints for a new feed-in-law or another roof-
programme and tried to build up political momentum. They were 
joined by local politicians that strongly favoured the idea of renew-
able energies and opted for more decentralised energy systems. For 
them, grid-connected photovoltaics applications met both of these 
aims. So it was a coalition of local politicians, the Green party, re-
searchers, environmental societies and business associations that 
managed to influence the federal government to improve and en-
hance its innovation policy for photovoltaics. Especially when the 
1000-roofs-programme ended, strategic niche management appeared 
on the local level: protagonists of the solar scene were successful in 
implementing local feed-in-laws, inspired by the Solar Group Aachen 
e. V.. In contrast to the federal law, which only regulated the remu-
neration of photovoltaics power at arm’s length, the concept of the 
Solar Group Aachen e. V. worked with cost-covering prices. The de-
velopment of a policy instrument that aims to convince users pur-
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chasing PV for return on investment reasons can be interpreted as a 
change in secondary aspects. Still adhering to its policy core, the PV 
coalition learned new ways to achieve its goal. Thus the new mecha-
nism paved the way for the wider diffusion of photovoltaics by mak-
ing them a financially attractive investment not only for ideologically 
motivated environmentalists. 
These initiatives were strongly supported by the infant 
photovoltaics industry and its associations. The solar industry inten-
sified its lobbying, and in particular due to some of the global players 
that were also involved in cell production, such as Siemens and ASE, 
becoming part of the advocacy coalition, political pressure became 
more effective. As Siemens was already producing in the USA, com-
plaining, that due to the lack of domestic demand in Germany, it 
would not make sense, coming back to Germany and ASE threatened 
to follow Siemens, in the case that no follow up programme would be 
started; the federal government started a debate on the 100.000-roofs-
programme. This long-term-perspective for public funding i.e. creat-
ing a niche market was the reason for ASE to stay in Germany and 
even build up new production plants. It increased its capacity from 
20 to 50 MW by the end of 2002 under the name of RWE-Schott Solar 
(cf. Jacobsson/Lauber 2006:268).  
In the PV coalition’s formative stage significant opposition 
arose. Industrial organizations, especially German utilities strongly 
opposed political instruments to support photovoltaics, such as the 
early energy-feed-in-law from 1991 (cf. Wong 2005: 135). In 1994 
Preussen Elektra lodged a complaint against this law on the Euro-
pean and the federal level. Opposition formed not only due to gen-
eral criticism towards subsidising renewable energy technologies, but 
it was also the specific design of the feed-in law, which indeed disad-
vantaged some of the utilities. Since renewable energy is mainly pro-
duced in the windy regions near the coast (wind power) and photo-
voltaics applications are concentrated in the sunny South, this bias 
meant that some Northern utilities or their customers respectively, 
had to finance subsidies for renewable energy technologies. The case 
was dismissed in the courts, but the discussion did not recede.  
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4.2 Take-Off 
Following Sabatier’s argument, policy change can only be achieved 
following external perturbations, such as changes in the government 
coalition or impacts from other subsystems. This also seems to be true 
in the case of PV. When in 1998 the Green party, together with the 
Social Democrats formed the federal government, the photovoltaics 
advocacy coalition took its chance. Now it did not have to be content 
any more with merely influencing the rebuilding of institutional 
frames and policy programmes from the outside of political institu-
tions. The Greens took over the ministry of the environment and this 
initiated the institutionalisation of the photovoltaics advocacy coali-
tion within the centre of political power. The situation in the late 
1990s was accompanied by international and European trends, such 
as the liberalisation and deregulation of the energy sector. In the 
wake of the Kyoto protocol international organisations as well as the 
European Commission made CO2 reduction a top priority political 
goal.  
As a consequence, the change in political power constella-
tions was linked to a beginning restructuring of the energy sector. 
Institutional settings and the infrastructure of the energy sector 
started to become more open and fluent. Corporate structures were 
being reorganised and became replaced by more competitive man-
agement and governance structures. Thus innovation in photovol-
taics was accompanied by the re-structuring of the energy sector and 
social innovations like new management concepts, new user routines, 
“new roles and identities of electricity customers, new policy prob-
lems, regulatory concepts, institutions and governance arrange-
ments” (cf. Voß et al. 2003: 4). It can be assumed that these changes 
and transformation processes in the sector did not only shape the 
background but more fundamentally have been crucial factors in 
triggering innovation in photovoltaics. Institutional changes, such as 
deregulation in the energy sector and objectives formulated by the 
European Union concerning the transformation of the energy sector 
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opened up a policy window of opportunity for the success of an ad-
vocacy coalition against the opposition of the powerful advocates of 
incumbent energy sources.  
Two policy instruments were designed and implemented, 
which are widely believed as being decisive for the German photo-
voltaics success story. The actual design of the instruments has been 
prepared and debated by solar groups, societies and associations. 
Groups like Eurosolar (European Association for Renewable Ener-
gies), the German Association for the Promotion of Solar Power and 
Greenpeace were extremely important for an adjusted ‘relaunch’ of 
the 1000-roofs-programme and the first feed-in-law of 1991. The lo-
cally installed feed-in-tariffs could now serve as blueprints for a new 
feed-in system on the federal level. Furthermore, the lobbying activi-
ties of associations and environmental groups helped to shape a nov-
el roofs-program on a far larger scale. On this basis in 1999 the 
100.000 roof programme was started. It was a market stimulation 
programme, which offered soft loans with 10 years duration and two 
years free of redemption. In 2000 the Renewable Energy Law was 
passed. It set a fixed feed-in tariff of around 50 Cent2
                                                          
2 The exact amount is subject to size and application: electricity from 
roof-top systems is reimbursed higher than electricity sourced from ground 
mounted systems. 
 per kWh for 20 
years, with a 5% decrease annually for later installations from 2002 
on. Compared to the first feed-in-law, which had been heavily op-
posed by the utilities, the additional costs of renewable energies were 
now shared and only five per cent of the financial charges had to be 
paid by the utilities. The law was inspired by the local feed-in laws 
for solar power. The learning effects that had been achieved on the 
local level helped the Green Party to move the concept to the federal 
level. For this process it was extremely helpful that one of the main 
protagonists of the local groups, who had organised local feed-in 
tariffs, was elected as a federal deputy in 1998 and thus could bring 
in experiences he had made on the local level (cf. Rosenbaum et al 
2005: 79). He was among the Green deputies, who initiated a discur-
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sive process involving various actors, such as environmental groups, 
solar industry associations, the association of the machinery and 
equipment producers VDMA, the metal workers trade union, solar 
cell producers and politicians from some Länder. This institutionalisa-
tion of an intermediate level of conflict can be interpreted along the 
lines of Sabatier’s policy learning. The panel did not intend to con-
duct a general discussion on the future of the German energy provi-
sion system (the policy core, still separating the coalitions), instead it 
only discussed the issue of financial support for renewable energy 
technologies. Hence, in 1998 the Green party acted as a policy broker, 
searching for compromises in secondary aspects that could be sup-
ported by the majority of actors and thus enlarging and finally stabi-
lising the advocacy coalition in a way that it would survive even 
without institutional backing in the future. “The unorthodox coalition 
even included a major utility (…); as a result the big utilities were not 
united in their opposition.” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 267) 
Further innovation in PV was still funded by public research 
grants – albeit at a decreasing rate. Public funds were concentrated 
more on network and cluster projects, many of which were embed-
ded in structural policies in order to help the economically underde-
veloped regions in the East of Germany. Regional cluster and net-
work policy is a rather new policy instrument that aims to create an 
innovation friendly environment by fostering collective identities and 
trust in order to support the formation and development of local 
networks (cf. Dohse 2007). Within the last years, the solar industry 
has well understood where to settle down in order to receive subsi-
dies. What we can see nowadays, are photovoltaics clusters in East 
Germany, predominantly located near the small town of Thalheim, in 
the vicinity of Bitterfeld, Saxony-Anhalt. Particularly small start-ups, 
which have emerged after 2000, have settled down in the East. One of 
the world leaders in cell production became Q-Cells, a firm, founded 
in Berlin in 1999, which soon moved to Thalheim in order to start cell 
production in 2001. Q-Cells is one example of Germany’s success 
story, i.e. it perfectly reflects the effectiveness of the 100.000-roofs 
programme and the Renewable Energy Law. By the end of 2002 it 
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employed 82 persons; at the end of 2004 it already had 484 employ-
ees, a number which has grown to 1.700 in the year 2007.  
Q-Cells also can be used as an example of how the photovol-
taics industry is now increasingly able to acquire financing and ven-
ture capital from the private sector and the equity market. Since Oc-
tober 2005 Q-Cells is listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange, and since 
December 2005 in its technology index TecDax. The first German PV 
firm to be listed on the stock exchange was the Solon AG in 1998. It 
was soon followed by the Solar World AG in 1999, the Sunways AG 
in 2001, the Solar-Fabrik AG in 2002 and many others. All these com-
panies were young start-ups, small and medium sized companies 
which considerably differ from the multinational firms such as Sie-
mens and ASE which had been dominating the early PV industry. 
The development and success of these new firms can be interpreted 
as evidence that the industry has left the formative stage, i.e. the 
niche market and has been entering the take off stage, i.e. is ready for 
market expansion.  
The market expansion and the activities of new actors in the 
sector have been accompanied by the significant enlargement and 
diversification of the photovoltaics advocacy coalition. This applies to 
producers as well as to users. Whereas first producers like the 
Freiburg Solar-Fabrik, founded in 1996 by the environmentalist 
Georg Salvamoser, were embedded in local solar networks and were 
not solely led by return on investment thinking, motives and behav-
iours of producers like Q-Cells, Solar World or Solon do not differ 
from producers in other sectors. Additionally, due to the EEG, users 
of photovoltaics are no longer necessarily led by ‘green’ motives, as it 
has increasingly become profitable to purchase solar modules, espe-
cially for farmers, who have plenty of space on their barn roofs, 
which can be used as building ground for the rather cheap thin film 
technology (cf. Rosenbaum et al 2005: 85f.).3
                                                          
3  The literature on strategic niche management sees the prevalence of 
economic motives as an impediment to the success of policies (Hoogma et al. 
 Furthermore, this devel-
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opment is supported by the wide acceptance of solar energy within 
the German public. This trend is vividly reflected in the Christian 
Democratic Party, which now has well accepted the policy of sup-
porting photovoltaics. So when in 2005 the Red-Green government 
ended and was replaced by the grand coalition of Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats, the new government did not opt to take a 
new path. The Renewable Energy Law was not abolished and it is 
safe to say, that the recent amendment of the law does not entail 
comprehensive changes for PV support.  
The take-off stage has also been accompanied by organiza-
tional changes, which helped to consolidate the chosen path. In 2002, 
after the re-election of the Red-Green government, coalition talks 
assigned the ministry of the environment full responsibility for re-
newable energies. Whereas the beginning of the formative stage had 
been characterised by conflicts of competences between the ministry 
of economics and the ministry of research, both being rather averse to 
substantially supporting photovoltaics, in 2002 the situation had 
changed completely. The ministry of the environment is now respon-
sible for the Renewable Energy Law as well as the public financing of 
photovoltaics related R&D.4
                                                                                                                            
2002). We are arguing that exactly the opposite mechanism (addressing eco-
nomic motives) has been essential for the success of PV policies.   
 Meanwhile the photovoltaics industry in 
Germany is highly differentiated, thanks to its ability to employing 
diverse methods of production and in its capability to build up im-
portant links to supplier industries. Therefore photovoltaics related 
R&D is not just research on new materials and cell efficiencies. Espe-
cially the German machine building industry has benefited from the 
emergence of the photovoltaics industry, much like German solar 
4  Another form of institutionalisation are the so called ‘Glottertal 
talks’, which are strategic talks on photovoltaics related R&D. These talks 
originated in 1987, but have gained importance particularly during the last 
couple of years. Researchers and representatives of the leading institutes and 
companies meet with members of the ministry of the environment in order to 
discuss future public R&D activities for PV. 
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producers gained advantages from the expertise of the machine 
building industry nearby – since; as we have stated before, innova-
tions in photovoltaics happen mainly through cost reductions in pro-
duction processes. For the German machine building sector, a strate-
gic orientation to PV manufacturing equipment can be observed. The 
development of ‘turn-key’ facilities helped to enable mass production 
and facilitated the standardisation process (cf. Dewald 2007: 132). 
These are crucial preconditions in order to achieve economies of scale 
and making PV applications more competitive (cf. Auer 2008: 12).  
Furthermore architects and craftsmen, especially electricians 
have adapted well to the new technology as a growth option for their 
businesses and the institutions of vocational education managed to 
adjust their curricula. Thus well-known bottle-necks that often con-
strain the diffusion of new technologies have been overcome. 
Looking at the machine building industry, an actor which 
cannot be considered to be part of the energy policy subsystem 
proper, but is strongly supporting the PV coalition by now, the spe-
cific dynamic of the advocacy coalition described in this article can be 
illustrated. At the beginning of the formative stage, there was a single 
minded coalition supporting renewable energy technologies. At that 
time it shared a joint policy core, which was the transformation of the 
energy sector, substituting nuclear and fossil power plants for renew-
able energy technologies. Then learning processes during the course 
of this stage, helped to develop new policy instruments. Former radi-
cal opposition against the traditional energy sector, based on theories 
and visions highlighting worst case scenarios on the one hand and 
demonstrations and blockade actions on the other hand, gave way to 
more pragmatic considerations and helped the coalition to gain po-
litical power. The new PV policy core of the transformed coalition is 
now characterised not as pure opposition, but as supporting PV. Its 
formation has been accompanied by new theories, visions and ideas 
on generating demand for PV by reducing costs, increasing returns, 
spreading information and eventually by finding ways to enlarge the 
coalition. These dynamics resulted in the integration of actors like the 
machine building industry, even some of the utilities, who either do 
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not belong to the policy subsystem or explicitly share another policy 
core and cross party members from the Eastern part of Germany. At 
this time, when the original policy core (transformation) was changed 
by the formerly secondary aspect, ‘supporting PV’, the ground was 
prepared for the integration of a very heterogeneous set of actors. 
4.3 Success Indicators 
In a next step we intend to highlight the successful development of 
PV with the help of some quantitative indicators. In order to measure 
‘success’ we will use the indicators ‘installed PV power’, ‘produc-
tion’, 'export sales’, ‘employees’ and ‘patents’.  
As figure 2 impressively shows, installed PV power was on a 
relatively low level, then doubled for the first time in 2000 and has 
grown continuously since then. These findings demonstrate the cor-
relation between policy instruments that were applied by the federal 
Red-Green coalition government, the regulatory instrument EEG and 
the 100.000 roofs programme and the expansion of the market (see 
below). 
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Fig. 2: PV power installed in Germany (MWp). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009)  
 
In 2005 “…Germany accounted for more than 93% of the EU 
25” (Jäger-Waldau 2006: 75) installations. The data for 2004 and 2005 
are not totally reliable though, as there exist huge discrepancies in the 
reported data, since after the end of the 100.000 roofs programme in 
2003 and the revision of the EEG in 2004, no procedure had been es-
tablished to register the dramatic increase of installations (cf. Jäger-
Waldau 2006: 77). 
Stable political and socio-economic conditions do not only 
convince private households to install photovoltaic power installa-
tions, but solid markets also stimulate the investment in new produc-
tion capacities for solar cells and modules.  
As figure 3 shows, cell production has grown to almost 1500 
MW annually. Sales as well as export shipments of the German 
photovoltaics industry have been rising with a comparable rate, as 
can be seen in figures 3 and 4. 
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Fig. 3: Solar cell production in Germany (Mw). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) 
 
 
Fig. 4: Sales of the German photovoltaics industry. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) 
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Fig. 5: Export sales of the German photovoltaics industry. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) 
 
Fig. 6: PV-price index in €. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar) 2009 
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In a relative short time period the German industry was also 
able to improve productivity that enabled prices for installed PV 
modules to fall by a quarter between 4/2006 and 1/2009. (Cp. Fig. X). 
Sales figures and numbers of photovoltaics power installed 
clearly show the market success of photovoltaics. An even more 
common way of measuring innovation is patent data, since “...patents 
provide a uniquely detailed source of information on inventive activ-
ity” (cf. OECD 1994: 9). 
 
Fig. 7: Global patent applications in photovoltaics. 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Beucker und Fichter 
(Boderstep Institut für Innovation und Nachhaltigkeit 2007) 
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As figure 6 shows, Japan is by far the most active nation in 
patent applications, followed by the USA and Germany.5
 
 As can be 
seen from figure 7 German patent activities reflect quite well the 
global increase of photovoltaics patents from around 500 in the early 
1990s up to around 2000 in 2002. The numbers for Germany do not 
differ significantly from those for the USA, and Germany is far ahead 
of other industrialised countries, such as its European neighbours. 
The data seems to suggest that rather than being a precondition for 
the further development of PV the economic success of PV spurred 
hectic activities to protect intellectual property. 
Fig. 8: First filing of photovoltaic patents. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Visen-
tin/Voignier/Königstein 2005 
                                                          
5  It is striking that Japan accounts for 74% of all patent applications, 
but this is mainly due to characteristics of the Japanese patent law system, 
which makes the process of applying for a patent easier and cheaper than in 
the USA and Germany. Furthermore, in Japan normally one invention is 
divided into small elements and for each a patent application is filed (cf. 
Siemer 2005: 66). Therefore comparing German patent activities with the 
Japanese one has to be careful when drawing conclusions. 
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These figures clearly demonstrate the (at least short term) 
success of the PV industry. It is expanding production in Germany 
and off shore, it is increasing the export ratio of its production, it is 
employing ever more people, it is operating profitably and continu-
ally accumulates intellectual capital. Meanwhile more corporations 
are active in this sector and more people are employed in the sector 
than in many other established economic sectors.  
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5 Photovoltaics and Its Contenders 
During the last years quite a number of articles have been published, 
describing and analysing the transformation of the energy sector. 
Photovoltaics, as one of the renewables, has been described and ana-
lysed before. But only few publications have focused on the particu-
lar technological and institutional prerequisites, which enabled 
photovoltaics to become a real success story. Since the success of spe-
cific technologies in a system as complex as the energy supply system 
at least partly depends on the interaction with and the development 
path of competing or complementary systems, we will shortly review 
some of the other renewables, which have be following a slightly 
different trajectory, in order to develop some insights on what might 
be the particular comparative advantages of photovoltaics.  
The fuel cell and wind power technologies, just like photovol-
taics have received dedicated financial support schemes and bene-
fit(ed) from R&D programmes. But unlike photovoltaics, in the case 
of fuel cells support programmes failed to trigger a sufficient de-
mand, and research and industry had to postpone several times the 
availability of a sufficiently stable technology. In the second case, 
creating a niche market for wind power technologies was extremely 
successful at the beginning. But over the last years, wind power tech-
nologies and especially the German industry are increasingly suffer-
ing backlashes in the sense of the development of future applications, 
when compared with other European countries such as Denmark or 
Spain. The domestic market for wind power for some years had less 
future potential than the market for photovoltaics applications. Since 
the national onshore-market for wind park installations has become 
increasingly limited by social non-acceptance of wind power installa-
tions: the sight of installations is sometimes considered to damage the 
beauty of the landscape, environmental problems are discussed, and 
people living next to wind power plants complain about the noise 
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caused by wind turbines. For off-shore installations the tourism in-
dustry at the North Sea is afraid of losses resulting from wind power 
plants mutilating the nature and environmentalists are afraid of the 
consequences for animal and plant populations. Surveys show that 
the majority of the German population supports wind energy, want-
ing it to become an important energy resource in the future, its accep-
tance has always been significantly less pronounced than the support 
for photovoltaics. For example in 2003 a survey of the Allensbach 
Institute showed that 33 % of the respondents answered that wind 
turbines would disfigure landscapes whereas only 6 % of the respon-
dents were of the same opinion concerning photovoltaics installation 
(cf. Bundespresseamt 2003: 4). A Forsa-survey in 2008 showed higher 
acceptance even for solar parks, compared to wind parks (76 % vs. 55 
%) (cf. Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien e.V. 2008: 5). There are also 
administrative limits imposed by some federal States concerning the 
space between and the height of wind turbines (cf. VDI 2006: 17). 
Social and administrative opposition is additionally enforced by 
‘natural’ restrictions, since open space in windy regions is limited. As 
a consequence, at a quite early stage the idea of alternative applica-
tions, so called offshore wind farms became widely accepted by coun-
tries like Denmark, Britain and Sweden. In contrast to these lead 
markets, the German wind industry initially did not follow this off-
shore trend and hesitated for a long time to re-direct its research and 
development activities. Only recently, the realisation of the first Ger-
man offshore project (alpha ventus) began. The project is realised by 
a huge public-private syndicate, comprising public partners, associa-
tions, research institutes as well as commercial actors. Interestingly 
incumbent actors of the energy sector, like E.ON and Vattenfall are 
also among the partners (cf. BMU/Stiftung Offshore Windenergie 
2007). But since activities are in its infancy, at the moment the off-
shore industry’s technology leaders are Danish and Spanish firms. 
Traditional big producers of wind turbines from Germany are lag-
ging behind (cf. Manager Magazin 2007). The reasons are a mixture of 
technology specific and social factors, which at the moment constrain 
Germany becoming a lead market for off shore wind power tech-
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nologies. First of all the coast of the North Sea is well protected from 
becoming a wind farm due to the existence of around 700 citizens 
action groups opposing wind power plants. They are supported by 
nature societies like the Naturschutzbund, which articulated vehe-
ment protest against wind power plants close to the North Sea coast 
as they feared that bird sanctuaries and nature reserves will be 
threatened. Existing laws on nature conservation that particularly 
protect the Wadden Sea at the German North Sea coast back these 
apprehensions and resulted in complicated and long lasting approval 
procedures. Thus coastal off shore applications comparable to Dan-
ish, Swedish or British wind power plants will not be realised in 
Germany in the foreseeable future. As an alternative, German off-
shore applications can be realised far out in the North Sea. This strat-
egy is backed by the renewable energy law, which says that wind 
farms that are built after the 1st of January 2005, get only remunera-
tion, if they are located outside of bird sanctuaries and nature re-
serves (cf. dena 2005: 2). But these particularities raise costs for off-
shore applications tremendously and request new technological de-
velopments. Since there does not exist any experience with wind 
farms that are built above 20 to 40 meters deep water one would en-
ter completely new technological territory. Furthermore, when con-
necting these offshore wind power plants to onshore grids, addition-
ally high extra costs are due. The same already holds for big onshore 
wind power plants, as there is the risk, when feeding-in a larger 
quantity of wind power into the grid, that grid configurations get 
overloaded. So additionally, an expensive expansion and reconstruc-
tion of existing grids will be necessary in order to tap the full poten-
tial of big wind power plants. In contrast PV resembles more a 
“small” decentralized technology with more limited compatibility 
problems to the existing grid structure. 
Another energy technology, which has been targeted by the 
German innovation policy is the aforementioned fuel cell technology. 
But in contrast to wind power and photovoltaics, it has not yet man-
aged to enter the large scale market. The reasons are for one techno-
logical characteristics that constrain its market expansion. First of all, 
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fuel cells need hydrogen as prime energy source, so the creation of a 
niche market, and even more the market expansion of the fuel cell 
technology depends on the parallel development of the hydrogen 
technology. Furthermore, the acceptance and expansion of fuel cells 
are heavily dependent on supporting infrastructures like fuelling 
stations offering hydrogen. If these do not exist, the technology seems 
unhelpful for potential end-users. Until now, the hydrogen technol-
ogy is lacking innovative leaps which could have led to substantial 
cost reductions. Instead, the technology is still very expensive, which 
constrains the acceptance and diffusion of fuel cells.  
Figure eight and ten show the different trajectory of the wind power 
plant sector when compared with PV. After an initial steady increase 
– which already predated the introduction of new regulatory instru-
ments, the new construction activities stalled somewhat after 2002. 
This might change again in the future given the recent amendments 
of the EEG.  
 
Fig. 9: Additional construction of wind power plants in Germany. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Molly (DEWI GmbH 
2008) 
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Fig. 10: Annually and total installed power in Germany. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008) 
 
Nevertheless the overall importance of PV is far less than 
wind power. The amount of energy one additonal wind installation is 
able to produce is much higher when compared to the small, 
decentralised PV installations (see fig. 9). 
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Fig. 11: Annually installed power in Germany. 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008) 
 
Fig. 12: Installed power in Germany. 
 Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008) 
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Fig. 13: Sales (in Mio. €). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband 
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)  
 
With respect to aspects of industrial policy PV is much more 
dominated by German producers and German technology. The PV 
industry might be able to overtake the wind power industry with 
respect to sales (see fig 12). In spite of the increasing exports of the PV 
industry, it is less dependent on the export markets than the wind 
power industry – given the unclear further development of the mar-
ket (see fig 13 and 14).   
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Fig. 14: Export sales (in Mio. €). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband 
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)  
 
Fig. 15: Export ratio (manufacturer and supplier). 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband 
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)  
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Fig. 16: Numbers of employees. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband 
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband 
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)  
 
Both industries, however, are developing into important em-
ployers with the dynamic again being more pronounced in the PV 
than in the wind power industry (see fig. 15). This dynamic can also 
be seen in the development of costs of electricity generation. At the 
moment electricity generated by PV modules is much more expensive 
than wind energy. But while the costs of wind energy will decrease 
only slightly over next years, great cost reductions are expected in the 
PV industry.   
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Fig. 17: Average values of electricity generation costs of new plants. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: BMU (2008) 
 
Fig. 18: Average values of electricity generation costs of total plant 
stock. 
 
Source: own illustration based on data from: BMU (2008) 
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6 A Future for Photovoltaics? 
In the beginning we claimed that the creation of niche markets can be 
a successful policy instrument in coordinated market economies (hy-
pothesis 1), if a powerful advocacy coalition can be mobilised (hy-
pothesis 2). Our analysis has shown that the support of PV after 1998 
was successful in establishing a growing and profitable economic 
activity. The PV industry can produce and sell its products both in 
Germany and abroad. The story, however, has also proven that the 
success of such a policy depends on many favourable circumstances. 
It does not only need broad political and public support that goes 
beyond the initial policy core, but also a delicate architecture of in-
struments that are geared towards the special characteristics of the 
system to be supported. The policy instruments are mostly not ge-
neric, but geared towards the specific problems of the PV industry.   
The success of PV is also linked to frame conditions, offering 
a window of opportunity for change. The electric power sector over 
the last years faced new challenges. These challenges came from a 
move to liberalize markets, the expectation that the sector should 
contribute to environmental aims and the development of new tech-
nologies (e.g. renewable energies) hard to integrate into the dominant 
regime of the sector. PV as an innovation successfully exploited the 
chances offered. A form of decentralized, small technology which 
could be connected to the grid without severe difficulties and com-
patibility problems, it achieved nearly unanimous support by a pub-
lic in favour of clean technologies. It was supported by an advocacy 
coalition comprising scientists, politicians, environmentalists and 
increasingly economic actors. PV could build on the already existing 
scientific strengths in this area as well as the expertise of suppliers 
(e.g. machine building industry). Insofar some elements of path de-
pendency are to be seen even in this case.  
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The political instruments developed offered long term security for the 
industry as well as incentives to build new production units in the 
disadvantaged regions of the new German Laender. The users of PV-
modules were guaranteed a 20 year security on their investments. 
Insofar PV could serve many masters. The present strength of the 
coalition has only recently been proven when the federal government 
amended the Renewable Energy Law without implementing impor-
tant changes. It achieved nearly unanimous support by a public in 
favour of clean technologies; it was supported by an advocacy coali-
tion comprising of scientists, politicians, environmentalists and in-
creasingly economic actors. 
Taken together the many beneficial factors and the very spe-
cific composition of the advocacy coalition also point towards the 
difficulties in imitating this successful experiment in other areas. The 
lesson being not necessarily that the same policy should be and can 
be pursued in other cases as well. The general message rather is that 
customized innovation policies need to reflect the specific conditions 
and opportunities in the targeted areas.  
As Rammert (1997) states, post-modern reflexive innovation 
policy intends to connect heterogeneous actors by avoiding negative 
externalities that may result from hierarchical or market forms of 
coordination. Such network activities are looked upon as being more 
suitable to innovation processes, especially under the auspices of 
globalisation and ongoing deregulation processes. „Initiatives must 
be taken to foster experiments with the new technology; these must 
give rise to entrepreneurial activity by either new or existing entities; 
economic and technological competence must be built and diffused 
among suppliers and users; capital must be supplied; and bridging 
functions must be developed – institutions and networks need to be 
built and knowledge must be transferred“(cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson 
1997: 272). Policy effectiveness thus builds on a challenging combina-
tion of diverse activities. 
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